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Abstract 
Deforestation is a major source of CO2 emissions, accounting for around 17% of total annual 
anthropogenic carbon release. While the costs estimates of reducing deforestation rates 
considerably vary depending on model assumptions, it is widely accepted that emissions 
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concerns over a possible “flooding” of REDD credits, various limits to the number of REDD 
allowances entering the carbon market are considered. Finally, unlike previous studies, we 
account for both direct and indirect effects occurring on land and timber markets resulting from 
lower deforestation rates. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Tropical deforestation is a major source of CO2 emissions and the main cause of 
biodiversity loss. According to the 2007 Fourth IPPC report, deforestation accounts for 
around 17% of total annual atmospheric carbon release (IPCC 2007). Given the rising 
concern of potential dangerous risks accruing from high level of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) concentrations, a large number of economic studies have 
already analyzed the potential for and costs of emission reduction through avoided 
deforestation. Estimates vary considerably depending on modelling assumptions, 
however it is widely accepted that avoided deforestation can offer large mitigation 
opportunities at a relatively low cost. This result is particularly robust as confirmed by 
studies conducted with different methodologies. 
Thus for instance, Kindermann et al (2008) comparing the results from three different 
global forestry and land-use models show that a carbon price of 100$ per ton of CO2 
could abate 2.8-4.7 of Gt of CO2 from deforestation activities during the period 2005–
2030, representing more or less 10% of total 2004 CO2 emissions as reported by IPCC 
2007. According to their analysis, the lowest-cost avoided deforestation opportunities 
are to be found in Africa, Central and South America and Southeast Asia.  
Similar findings come from a branch of literature which “couples” forestry models with 
more economic oriented integrated assessment models in the attempt to nest forestry 
dynamics into a more realistic representation of the economic system. In this vein 
Sohngen and Mendelsohn, (2003) linked a global forestry model with the DICE model 
of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and suggest that forestry could cost effectively account 
for 30% of total carbon abatement across the century. Tavoni et al. (2007) used the 
World Induced Technological Change Hybrid model (WITCH) to analyse the impacts 
of introducing forestry mitigation opportunities on the costs of meeting a 550 ppmv CO2 
concentration target. According to this last study, forest activities generates policy cost 
savings of around 40% that could be used to finance an additional 0.25°C less warming 
by the end of the century. Both studies, however, considered not only opportunities 
from avoided deforestation but also included afforestation, reforestation and forest 
management. More recently, Bosetti et al. (2009) analyzed specifically the role of 
avoided deforestation under a more stringent stabilization target (450 ppmv CO2). This   3
study explicitly models a potential emission trading market based on national emissions 
reduction commitments and allows for the possibility to “bank” emissions allowances. 
When REDD generated credits can be sold, forest emissions considerably decrease and 
total costs of the stabilization policy are lowered by 10-23%. Or alternatively, REDD 
could enable a additional reduction of 20ppmv of CO2 equivalent concentration without 
policy costs increase. 
The comprehensive Eliasch Review (2008) has investigated the impact of introducing 
credits from forestry activities and CDM into the European Union emissions trading 
scheme (EU ETS). The study concludes that a 50% supplementarity
1 would allow a 
30% emissions cut at the same cost of a 20% cut with a 30% supplementarity during 
Phase III of the EU ETS. The role of forest credits is substantial: it could lower the costs 
of halving global carbon emissions from 1990 levels by up to 50% in 2030 and by up to 
40% in 2050. 
Finally, Dixon et al. (2008) using a numerical multi-country, two-sector partial 
equilibrium model of the global carbon market concluded that international permit price 
would be reduced by 45% when, in addition to CDM, unlimited carbon credits from 
avoided deforestation are available. Moreover, policy compliance costs decrease by 
more than one third. Their analysis assessed the impacts of climate policies in a single 
period market ending in 2020 considering a post Kyoto 2012-2020 scenario where 
emission reduction targets were based on public announcements. 
In this paper we address the role REDD may play in the European carbon market, in the 
context of a mitigation policy aiming to reduce EU emissions by 20% respect to 1990 in 
2020. We use a multiregional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. We not 
only discuss the likely implications of REDD for carbon market prices and policy costs 
but also examine carbon leakage, distributional aspects resulting from climate policies 
or incentives to participate in a carbon trading system when reduction emissions from 
avoided deforestation are considered. Unlike previous studies addressing the potential 
introduction of REDD credits in carbon markets we account for direct and indirect 
effects occurring both on land and timber markets. Reductions in deforestation rates are 
endogenously calculated using a carbon market price signal, decreasing both the amount 
of land available to agricultural uses and the flow of wood entering timber markets in 
                                                 
1 the proportion of abatement effort that can be met with non-Annex I country credits   4
respect to what would occur in a business as usual scenario or a policy not accounting 
for REDD credits. While most studies on carbon markets and avoided deforestation do 
not take into account this effect, it represents a cost to countries providing REDD 
credits and may, therefore, influence incentives to participate in a carbon trading system. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents data and modelling framework. 
Section 3 discusses results and section 4 concludes. 
 
2  The modelling framework 
 
The modelling tool used for the analysis of the implication of REDD in the global 
economy is provided by the recursive-dynamic ICES CGE model based on the core 
structure of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and database version 6 
(Dimaranan, 2006). Its production side is however that of the GTAP-E model (Burniaux 
and Truong, 2002). This in order to account for a more satisfactory representation of the 
energy and emission sides of economic systems. GTAP-E also includes carbon taxes 
and an Emission Trade (ET) module to simulate international carbon market which are 
key to our investigation. We updated that, originally restricted to emission reduction 
from fossil fuel use, to account for emission reduction from avoided deforestation and 
the trading of carbon credits originated. As said, the model is a dynamic recursive one. 
However in the present study we use it in a simplified version basically projecting in 
just one time step all the system from 2001 (the calibration year) to 2020. The regional 
and sectoral detail of the model, its production tree and baseline assumptions are 
reported in appendix I. 
The role of avoided deforestation has then been introduced through three different 
channels. 
Firstly, a set of equations computing regional emission reductions from avoided 
deforestation in response to different carbon prices have been added to the model. 
Parameterization of these equations are derived from the IIASA Cluster model (Gusti et 
al. 2008) prepared for the Eliasch (2008) report.  
Following Kindermann et al. (2008), we assume that avoided deforestation and the 
associated credits come only from the lowest-cost avoided deforestation opportunities   5
areas: Africa, Central and South America and Southeast Asia. However, according to 
the deforestation rates obtained trough IIASA Cluster model (Gusti et al. 2008)) more 
than the 94% of total world deforestation activity took place in these areas (2000 data). 
We also assume that all these regions have already established institutional and 
governmental structures that would allow them to immediately enter the European 
trading scheme. Those reduction are then subtracted from the total emissions originated 
by the model. The generated credits can be sold in the international carbon market and 
accrue national income of the sellers and decrease that of the buyers.  
Secondly, changes in deforestation patterns fostered by the possibility to sell REDD 
credits into the carbon market affect agricultural, forestry and pasture land use, i.e. the 
regional land stocks. Indeed more forest remaining unharvested implies a lower amount 
of land available to agricultural and pasture activities. This lower availability is defined 
with respect to a baseline land availability under “business as usual deforestation rates”.  
Both baseline regional land availability and its mitigation-policy driven change have 
been estimated starting from the IIASA cluster model. This provides baseline emissions 
from deforestation that we converted to (lost) forest hectares using UN FAO (2006). To 
simplify, we assumed that each hectare lost to forest is gained to agriculture/pasture 
(and vice versa). Then, baseline land availability is endogenously corrected in response 
to (lower) deforestation under different carbon prices.  
Thirdly, reduced deforestation resulting from different carbon prices also decreases the 
total amount of wood entering timber markets. To account for this fact, we follow a 
similar approach to the one described above. A business as usual timber supply is then 
endogenously modified accounting for the lower harvesting induced by the possibility 
to sell REED credits. The relation between non harvested hectares and timber 
production from primary forest (cubic meters) has been estimated coupling data from 
FAO (UN FAO 2006) with Brown (2000) reporting information on timber extraction 
from primary and forest plantation . 
The simulation exercise is performed for year 2020.  
Three different scenarios are compared: 
The no policy business as usual. This is a 2020 benchmark obtained perturbing the 
calibration year equilibrium (2001) in order to replicate regional population and GDP 
growth consistent with the A2 IPCC scenarios.    6
EU emission reduction policy without REDD: this assumes that the EU implements 
unilaterally a 20% emission reduction compared to 1990. At this stage we consider only 
one regional aggregate for the EU, thus this exercise is equivalent to one in which, 
within the EU, the burden of abatement can be allocated efficiently across sectors and 
countries through an EU carbon market. 
EU emission reduction with REDD. Same as above, but with the additional possibility 
for Sub Saharan Africa (SSA thereafter), Central and South America (LACA thereafter) 
and Southeast Asia (EASIA thereafter) to enter the EU ETS selling REDD credits. Note 
that it is assumed that these regions can participate to the EU carbon market even 
without accepting binding reduction quota, but only on the basis of proven reduction in 
“business as usual” deforestation activities. This option has been chosen as it should 
provide the highest incentive to REED countries to engage in deforestation actions and 
allows us to isolate its role in the policy context.  
3  Results 
 
3.1  REDD and overall policy implication 
 
The EU unilateral mitigation policy imposes the region a reduction of 866 million tons 
of CO2 originating a price on the carbon market of 46$/t CO2 (Table 1) at a cost for the 
EU as a whole of roughly 0.9% of its GDP compared to the baseline
2 (Table 2). The 
unilateral EU effort originates the well known leakage effect. Commodities produced in 
countries with a less stringent climate policy (in our case without a climate policy 
indeed) become more competitive as they are not charged with environmental taxes. 
They are thus increasingly demanded, and increasingly produced. Consequently 
emissions outside the EU also increase. The study highlights a quite strong leakage 
(+1.2 % of emissions in the non EU countries) offsetting roughly 45% of European 
reductions (see Fig. 1). This however should be interpreted as the most pessimistic 
                                                 
2 These figures are perfectly in line with the existing literature. As a comparison we just quote the 2008 
EC staff working documents on the cost of meeting the 20-20-20 EU target which estimate for the EU27 
a cost ranging from the 0.54% to the 0.66% of GDP with a price ranging from 30 to 47€/t CO2 (SEC 
2008a,b).   7
possible outcome as it is assumed that no country outside the EU will put in place any 
emission reduction policy. Interestingly, in this context, it is the USA that contributes 
more to the world increased emissions, however emerging economies (LACA, FSU, 
MDE and China) also represent a significant share. 
By opening the EU ETS to REDD credits the price of carbon is expected to drop to 8$/t 
CO2 (a reduction of the 83%). Basically the supply of REED credits, without restriction, 
could alone meet almost the totality of emission reduction required to the EU. 
Accordingly, the concern that an unrestricted use of REDD credits could flood the 
carbon market appears justified in this specific context. The EU would buy 6700 $ 
million of imported pollution right, but “gaining” a drop of GDP costs from the original 
1% to the 0.2%  compared to the baseline. 
The most interesting effect is probably that on leakage: the possibility for the EU to buy 
its reduction from REED countries is much less penalizing in term of competitiveness 
than unilateral reduction. EU commodities “suffer” less in international markets and 
symmetrically the competitive advantage for non EU countries is reduced. Increase in 
non EU emissions now offsets just the 12% of EU reduction and GDP gains in the non 
EU are lower (see table 2). 
This trend applies to REDD countries as well. 
On the one hand, SSA, EASIA and LACA increase their GDP in the REED compared 
to the no policy baseline scenario. Thus benefits from selling REDD credits to the EU 
are larger than their direct and indirect costs. We recall than in our exercise the first are 
triggered by lower land available to agriculture/pasture and lower raw wood supply to 
the timber sector (see below). On the other hand, all these regions are unambiguously 
better off if a carbon market is introduced in Europe without the possibility to use 
REDD credits (see 8
th and 2
nd columns in Table 2). While this may seem counter-
intuitive, the explanation behind this result is actually straightforward since it is directly 
related with carbon leakage. For REDD countries, the EU loss of competitiveness in a 
unilateral mitigation action outweighs gains from selling REED, but to a more 
competitive EU. This is a typical example of indirect effects - on GDP through 
competitiveness - being larger than direct effects - on GDP through revenues from sold 
credits -. This is not uncommon especially when these last, as in our case, are small.   8
They indeed amount just to  0.08%, 0.21% and 0.09% of GDP for EASIA, SSA and 
LACA respectively. 
Thus summarizing: a full opening of the ETS market to REDD credits would be in the 
EU interest, but not in that of REDD regions. Rephrasing this using the coalition theory 
jargon: the participation by REDD regions is profitable, but not internally stable. For 
them it would be better to free ride on the EU agreement. Note also that, in our context, 
gains from free-riding arise only because of higher competitiveness and not because of 
an improved environmental quality brought about by EU emission reductions. 
It is worth stressing that this result should be interpreted with care: it is driven by the 
economic leakage which is one of the most difficult aspect to measure.  
Firstly, it is determined by the shape of the agreement determining it. Larger 
participation and the possibility to sell REDD together with other emission reduction 
credits may lower its size. 
Secondly, it depends on the evolution of the import/export composition in the world 
market on its turn influenced by technological factors which are very difficult to capture. 
Thirdly, it depends on the substitution possibility between imported and domestic goods, 
i.e. Armington elasticities, which can change over time. 
 
3.2  Effects on land and timber sectors. 
 
A critical aspect regarding the use of REDD credits in an international carbon market 
concerns its eventual impact on land and agricultural prices on regions selling avoided 
deforestation credits. To show the relevance of this effect, Figures 2 and 3 contrast the 
change in land and timber prices estimated by our exercise, i.e. considering impacts on 
land and timber supply (“modified model” in figures), with those originated by an 
exercise in which these are not included (“unmodified model” in figures). 
When direct land use effects resulting from reduced deforestation are not modelled, we 
observe that land prices are marginally affected when the European carbon market is 
opened to this type of credit. In contrast, when these are taken into account and no 
restrictions are imposed to the used of REDD credits, land prices increase by 1.1% for   9
SSA, 2% for EASIA and 1.4% for LACA with respect to business as usual levels. One 
could expect to observe a higher increase in land prices especially considering that the 
current policy would reduce deforestation rates in the year 2020 by 22% compared to 
business as usual. However in term of agricultural/pasture land this means a lower 
availability of just the 0.9% compared to BAU. As a consequence also the effects on 
food prices are negligible. A policy requiring more stringent efforts, eventually 
involving more partners, would likely affect land prices in these regions on a higher 
scale. 
We observe a very similar result regarding changes in timber prices. When timber flows 
are not directly modelled to take into account land use change impacts, prices remain 
almost unaffected. However when these are explicitly modelled, timber prices increase 
by 2.6% in LACA, 3.4% in EASIA and 4.7% in SSA.  
An interesting case is that of the LACA region: indeed the EU climate policy (with and 
without REDD) would decrease land and timber prices below business as usual levels 
when direct effects on land and timber are not considered. This is a typical sectoral 
recomposition effect: although LACA economies are more competitive when the EU 
implements its mitigation policy, (indeed LACA GDP increases and its terms of trade 
improve), these gains are concentrated in the raw material and heavy industry sectors 
and not in agriculture and forestry whose demand and production fall. When the policy-
induced land and timber scarcity are correctly modelled however, their prices increase. 
 
3.3  Restrictions and incentives to selling REDD credits 
 
In this section we analyse the consequences of introducing limits to the use of REDD 
credits in the European Trading System. Restriction levels are defined as the maximum 
amount of total reduction efforts that can be met by Europe using REDD credits. 
Restrictions can be justified to control the carbon price decrease and maintain a 
sufficient dynamic stimulus to the development of environmental friendly and energy 
saving technologies, but also, in the light of what said, as an incentive to REDD 
countries to sell credits and not free ride on the EU mitigation policy.   10
Table 1 and 2 present, respectively, the different levels of CO2 prices and policy costs 
under various restriction levels. As can be expected, under the EU perspective, both 
carbon prices and policy costs increase with restrictions. Limiting the use of REDD 
credits therefore consists of an effective option to preventing an eventual flooding of 
“cheap” credits into the European carbon market and to keeping carbon prices high 
enough to stimulate investments in greener technologies, however at the expenses of 
higher policy costs. 
A good compromise between these two conflicting instances could be represented by a 
30% restriction to REDD credits: the carbon price would be reduced by approximately 
32%, against the 83% reduction when no limits to these type of credits are imposed; at 
the same time the policy cost measured in terms of GDP loss compared to the baseline 
equals 0.6%, against 1% in the case where no REDD credits are allowed to enter the 
ETS. The carbon leakage would remain quite high though, still offsetting 35% of 
European reductions. 
Under the point of view of the REDD regions, first of all it can be noticed that revenues 
from selling credits are not linear with restrictions (Figure 4). They are determined by 
the elasticity along the supply curves of REDD credits. Thus they typically follow a bell 
shaped trend. Thus the largest revenues for SSA and LACA are experienced when 
restrictions approximately reach the 50%, whereas for EASIA when they are no larger 
than the 10%. 
However, it is also clear that, except from the case of SSA when the use of REDD 
credits is limited to 5-10%, no restriction is able to make REDD regions better off 
participating to the market, than not participating and having the EU mitigating with 
unilateral action. 
It is thus confirmed that in our specific exercise indirect effects on competitiveness 
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Table 1. CO2 Price 
Access to REDD credits in the ETS market (100% = full)   
0%  5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%  50%  100% 
CO2 Price $/t  46  43  40 38 35 33 31  23 8 
% reduction wrt full 
access  to REDD 
credits use 
  -6% -12% -17% -22% -27% -32%  -50%  -83% 
 
 
Table 2. GDP: % changes w.r.t BAU 

























USA  0,012 0,012 0,011 0,009 0,008 0,006 0,003 
Europe  -0,952 -0,895 -0,839 -0,733 -0,635 -0,463 -0,160 
FSU  0,420 0,387 0,355 0,297 0,246 0,170 0,103 
KOSAU  0,079 0,075 0,071 0,064 0,056 0,044 0,023 
CAJANZ  0,050 0,048 0,045 0,040 0,035 0,027 0,010 
NAF  0,318 0,294 0,270 0,227 0,188 0,129 0,079 
MDE  0,184 0,171 0,158 0,134 0,112 0,078 0,039 
SSA  0,172 0,174 0,174 0,169 0,158 0,130 0,058 
SASIA  0,054 0,051 0,048 0,042 0,037 0,027 0,008 
CHINA  0,041 0,038 0,035 0,031 0,026 0,019 0,008 
EASIA  0,047 0,044 0,041 0,035 0,030 0,021 0,006 
LACA  0,064 0,062 0,061 0,057 0,053 0,043 0,023 
Note: in bold REDD regions   12
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Note: 100% means no restriction to REDD credits use, 0% means no possibility to use REDD credits 
4  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we addressed the role REDD may play in the European carbon market 
assuming that the EU reduces its CO2 emissions by 20% with respect to 1990 levels in 
year 2020. We used a multiregional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model and, 
differently from previous studies, we account for both direct and indirect effects 
occurring on land and timber markets resulting from lower deforestation rates. These, 
endogenously driven by carbon price signals, then trigger changes in land available to 
agricultural/pasture activities and in raw timber supply to the wood industry according 
to estimated functions which are implemented into the model. 
Consistently with previous works, we observed that including emissions reductions 
from avoided deforestation generates considerable policy cost savings peaking up to 
80% when no restriction to REDD credit use is imposed. We also confirmed that an 
unlimited availability of REDD credits could “flood” the market, drastically reduce 
carbon prices (by 83%), and therefore possibly lower the incentive to develop energy 
and carbon saving technologies. This can be, however, effectively controlled limiting 
the access to avoided deforestation permits. For instance, a 30% restriction to REDD   14
credit use would anyway reduce the policy cost by 34%, but keeping carbon price at the 
acceptably high level of 31$/t CO2. 
Interestingly enough, REDD has the additional benefit of reducing carbon leakage 
effects resulting from the introduction of the EU climate change policy. While leakage 
amounts for almost 45% of european reductions under a European trading system 
excluding REDD, this number decreases to 12% when unlimited access to REDD credit 
is allowed. The trend in carbon leakage is “mirrored” by that of the economic leakage. 
Each reduction in the first is coupled with a lower decrease in the competitiveness of 
EU commodities in international markets. This has important policy implications. 
Allowing REDD surely entails gain for the EU. This is not necesarily so for REDD 
regions though. They benefit from the inflow of REDD revenues, but they also face a 
more competitive EU in the trade arena. Indeed, we showed that the second effect 
prevails on the first. In particular, GDP in REDD regions is higher when they sell 
avoided deforestation credits to the EU compared with a no EU policy scenario. Thus 
benefits from avoided deforestation are higher than the opportunity costs represented by 
a lower land available to agriculture and pasture activities and by a lower timber supply 
to the wood industry. Nonetheless, when EASIA, SSA and LACA sell credits to the EU 
their GDP is lower compared to the case in which the EU implements unilaterally its 
mitigation policy. In other words, REDD regions would find it preferable to free ride on 
the EU mitigation policy. Note that in this analysis we are not taking into account the 
environmentl benefits triggered by EU emission reductions, but just those arising from 
international trade effects. If those were included, the free riding incentive would be 
even stronger. We also showed that, by and large, no restriction to REDD credit use can 
revert this outcome.  
Finally, the use of REDD credits can effectively reduce de-forestation activities (by 
22% in 2020 without restriction) and induce only moderate increases on land and timber 
prices in REDD regions (in a range of the 1%- 2% the first and of the 2.6% - 4.7% the 
second). 
Many developments are foreseen for the present work.  
Firstly, due to the crucial role played by the leakage effect, we would like to test the 
robustness of our results either to different parameterization of the Armington 
elasticities which drives the substitutability between domestic and imported   15
commodities (even though a plausible trend is that of an increase in this substitutability 
and accordingly that of a stronger leakage) or to a different design of the mitigation 
agreement. In this last respect an enlarged participation - for instance including all 
developed regions – will decrease the leakage and possibly reduce the incentive to free 
ride.  
Secondly we would like to improve the dynamic nature of the whole exercise. At 
present we are using a recursive-dynamic model just projecting the whole system in one 
jump to 2020. In a next work we would use one year time-steps to implement more 
detailed time specific curves for de-forestation activities.  
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Annex I: ICES technical appendix 
 
ICES is a recursive-dynamic CGE model for the world economy.  
The regional and sectoral detail of the model used for this study are represented in Table 
A1. 
Table A1. Regional and sectoral disaggregation of the ICES model 
Regions  Sectors 
USA: United  States  Rice  Water 
EUX  EU including   Wheat  Energy Intensive industries 
FSU:  Former Soviet Union  Other Cereal  Other industries 
KOSAU:  Korea, S. Africa, Australia  Vegetable Fruits  Market Services 
CAJANZ:  Canada, Japan, New Zealand  Animals  Non-Market Services 
NAF: North  Africa  Forestry   
MDE: Middle  East  Fishing   
SSA:  Sub Saharan Africa  Coal   
SASIA:  India and South Asia  Oil   
CHINA: China  Gas   
EASIA:  East Asia  Oil Products   
LACA:  Latin and Central America  Electricity   
 
ICES solves recursively a sequence of static equilibria linked by endogenous investment 
determining the growth of capital stock from 2001 to 2050. For the present study the 
model is run in a simplified version where endogenous investment decision drives 
2001-2020 growth in just one time leap.  
GDP growth rates for the region modelled replicate those of the IPCC A2 scenario and 
are reported in table A2.  
Table A2. GDP growth rates for the BAU (% 2001-2020) 
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Assumptions on the evolution of population (taken from UNPD, 2008), energy 
efficiency (taken from Bosetti et. al., 2006), GHG emission and of major fossil fuel 
prices (based on EIA, 2007 and EIA, 2009) are also incorporated and reported in Table 
A3. 
Table A3. Major exogenous variables growth rates for the BAU (% 2001-2020) 
Region  Population  Energy 
efficiency  CO2   Fuel  Price 
USA 15.6 12.8 21.6 Coal  16 
Med_Europe 0.5 17.1 1.7 Oil  74 
North_Europe 0.1 17.1 1.8 Gas  28 
East_Europe -4.6 40.4 28.6 Oil  Products  40 
FSU -3.2 36.6 74.0  
KOSAU 9.4 27.5 10.1  
CAJANZ -0.4 17.3 2.2  
NAF 31.7 26.8 65.5  
MDE 37.6 26.8 72.8  
SSA 46.9 22.0 129.2  
SASIA 29.9 44.7 115.5  
CHINA 12.3 47.5 145.7  
EASIA 24.3 43.5 75.3  
LACA 26.4 23.5 36.4  
 
Industries are modelled through a representative firm, minimizing costs while taking 
prices as given. In turn, output prices are given by average production costs. The 
production functions are specified via a series of nested CES functions. Domestic and 
foreign inputs are not perfect substitutes, according to the so-called “Armington” 
assumption. The production tree is reported in Figure A1. 
Figure A1. Nested tree structure for industrial production processes of the ICES model 
  Output Output
V.A. + Energy Other Inputs
Domestic Foreign
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A representative consumer in each region receives income, defined as the service value 
of national primary factors (natural resources, land, labour, capital, see Figure A2). 
Capital and labour are perfectly mobile domestically but immobile internationally. Land 
and natural resources, on the other hand, are industry-specific. 
This income is used to finance three classes of expenditure: aggregate household 
consumption, public consumption and savings. The expenditure shares are generally 
fixed, which amounts to saying that the top-level utility function has a Cobb-Douglas 
specification. 
Public consumption is split in a series of alternative consumption items, again according 
to a Cobb-Douglas specification. However, almost all expenditure is actually 
concentrated in one specific industry: Non-market Services. 
Private consumption is analogously split in a series of alternative composite Armington 
aggregates. However, the functional specification used at this level is the Constant 
Difference in Elasticities form: a non-homothetic function, which is used to account for 
possible differences in income elasticities for the various consumption goods. 
Investment is internationally mobile: savings from all regions are pooled and then 
investment is allocated so as to achieve equality of expected rates of return to capital. 
In this way, savings and investments are equalized at the world, but not at the regional 
level. Because of accounting identities, any financial imbalance mirrors a trade deficit 
or surplus in each region.  
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